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Oklahoma Tax Commission v. United States:
Death Taxes on Restricted Indian Personalty
Thomas E. Simmons*

In Oklahoma Tax Commission v. United States, the United States
Supreme Court upheld the application of a state inheritance tax to the
restricted personalty of deceased tribal members.1 The case turned on
statutory construction. The question: Had Congress withheld from
Oklahoma the power to tax Native Americans’ estates?2 Justice Hugo
Black, writing the plurality opinion, said no; restricted personalty of the
Indians’ estates was taxable.3 The Court’s conclusion still holds today,
but the path of reasoning by which it was reached is shaded by doubt.
Restricted Indian personalty is a unique variety of property defined
by federal law.4 Restricted personalty may not be alienated absent the
consent of the Department of Interior.5 It is not trust property (which
represents another unique variety of Indian property), but it shares
some of its characteristics. Restricted personalty reflects the sometimes
paternalistic relationship between Native Americans and the federal
government.
Prior cases posing similar questions6 had invoked the instrumentality theory, typically resulting in tax immunities for Indians. The theory
reflects the constitutional principle of safeguarding the federal government from state taxes (and vice versa). The instrumentality theory went
something like this: title to Indian trust land is held by the United States
as trustee for Native American beneficiaries. Intergovernmental immunities preclude state taxation of federal property or instrumentalities
(while precluding federal taxation of state agencies or property).7 Since
* Associate Professor, University of South Dakota School of Law.
1 Okla. Tax Comm’n v. United States, 319 U.S. 598, 610-11 (1943).
2 Id. at 600. The combined estates’ value was approximately $1.2 million. Id. at
600 n.1.
3 Id. at 600.
4 Id.
5 Id. at 601.
6 Id. at 602-03 (citing United States v. Rickert, 188 U.S. 432 (1908)).
7 Thomas Reed Powell, The Remnant of Intergovernmental Tax Immunities, 58
HARV. L. REV. 757, 788 (1945).
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the federal government holds title to Indian trust land, as a federal instrumentality, the land was immune to state taxes.8
Even property with only indirect connections to government could
be held immune under the doctrine.9 The doctrine’s broad sweep was
arrested in the mid-1930s along with judicial activism generally, and its
containment in tax jurisprudence continued in the years leading up to
Oklahoma Tax Commission in 1943.10 By then, the instrumentality theory offered little support for the argument that Oklahoma’s tax could
not be applied to Indians’ restricted personal property. As the 1982 edition of Cohen’s Handbook on Federal Indian Law put it: “The rush to
repudiate the broad version of the federal instrumentality doctrine
caught Indian property cases in its undertow.”11
Three estate proceedings had been consolidated in the case which
reached the Supreme Court. The first involved Lucy Bemore, a member
of the Seminole Tribe. She had died intestate survived by her husband
and son. The second, “Nitey” (oddly, no last name is given), also a
member of the Seminole Tribe, had died testate. Nitey had devised her
estate to her five children. The third, Wosey Deere, a member of the
Creek Tribe, had died intestate, survived by her husband and her three
children.12 About one-tenth of the value of all three estates represented
allotted fee land with restrictions against alienation. The remaining
nine-tenths was comprised of proceeds of oil and gas royalties generated
from that land.13 These royalty proceeds, comprised of cash and some
securities, were restricted personalty.
Oklahoma assessed inheritance taxes against each estate.14 The
Secretary of Interior, as trustee and quasi-executor, paid the taxes under
protest, then sought a refund.15 The district court held for Oklahoma.16
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed.17 The Supreme Court
8 United States v. Rickert, 188 U.S. 432, 437-39 (1903). Rickert’s holding also
rested on its interpretation of federal statute, the General Allotment Act. Id. at 433.
9 See Powell, supra note 7, at 774 n.48.
10 James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134, 161 (1937) (sustaining Congress’
ability to impose a tax on a federal contractor). See, e.g., Helvering v. Mountain Producers Corp., 303 U.S. 376, 386 (1939) (holding that tax immunity for an individual “because
he is engaged in operations under a government . . . lease cannot be supported”).
11 FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 422 (Rennard Strickland
et al. eds. 1982).
12 Okla. Tax Comm’n v. United States, 131 F.2d 635, 636 (10th Cir. 1942).
13 Okla. Tax Comm’n. v. United States, 319 U.S. 598, 600 (1943).
14 Id. at 599. The opinion and briefs use the terms “death tax,” “inheritance tax”
and “estate tax” interchangeably.
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 Okla. Tax Comm’n, 131 F.2d at 638.
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agreed that the real property was immune from the state tax, but held
that the restricted personal property was not.18
Justice Black wrote: “We conclude that [the Act of January 26,
1933] does not exempt the restricted property from taxation for two reasons: (1) the legislative history of the Act refutes the contention that an
exemption was intended; and (2) application of the normal rule against
tax exemption by statutory implication prevents our reading such an implication into the Act.”19 After dissecting the legislative history of the
statutes, Justice Black examined the statutory text; it lacked any express
exemption.
Just because the restricted personalty was inalienable did not mean
it was nontaxable. Inalienability and tax immunity are two different
things. “If Congress intends to prevent the State of Oklahoma from
levying a general non-discriminatory estate tax applying alike to all its
citizens, it should say so in plain words,” Black emphasized.20 Tax exemptions, as a matter of statutory construction, cannot be granted by
implication.21
Justice Frank Murphy penned a dissent.22 He argued that the case
was less a matter of statutory construction, and more one of history.
Generally, “strong considerations of fiscal and social policy view tax exemptions with a hostile eye.”23 But not where Indians’ property is involved. Tax immunity questions generally and Native Americans’ tax
immunities specifically are different inquiries. “For as to them a totally
different principle comes into operation, namely, the special status of
Indians during the whole course of our constitutional and legal history.”24 Given this history, “so far as the power of state to tax Indian
property is concerned, the ordinary rule of tax exemption is reversed; a
state must make an affirmative showing of a grant by Congress of the
withdrawal of the immunity of Indian property from state taxation.”25
Because the personalty was subject to alienation restrictions, state tax
immunity followed, the dissent concluded: “In other words restriction is
tantamount to immunity from state taxation.”26 Tax immunity and inalienability, the dissent concluded, are not distinct characteristics at all.
Five years later, the Supreme Court decided West v. Oklahoma Tax
Commission which sunk another nail in the coffin of the expansive in18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26

Okla.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id. at

Tax Comm’n, 319 U.S. at 611-12.
604.
607.
606.
612-24 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
612.
613.
614-15.
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strumentality doctrine.27 West upheld the application of Oklahoma’s inheritance tax to mineral rights held in trust by the Department of
Interior for a deceased member of the Osage Tribe.
After reviewing the retreat of the federal instrumentality doctrine
and Oklahoma Tax Commission, the Court concluded, “We fail to see
any substantial difference for estate tax purposes between restricted
property and trust property.”28 The fact that Native Americans held
title to restricted personalty in Oklahoma Tax Commission while in
West the United States held title as trustee “affords no distinguishing
characteristic from the standpoint of an estate tax.”29 Stone and Frankfurter dissented, joined by Douglas.30 This time, Justice Murphy wrote
the majority opinion.31 His switch underscored, perhaps, the power of
Black’s reasoning.
The legacy of both Oklahoma Tax Commission and West is a cloudy
one.32 In 1956, the United States Supreme Court decided Squire v.
Capoeman, reasoning that gain on the sale of timber from land held by a
Quinaielt Indian under trust patent was exempt from federal capital
gains tax.33 Capoeman did not overrule West or Oklahoma Tax Commission. It interpreted a different statute.34 Yet Capoeman implied an
exemption from taxation that was not expressly articulated by the Congressional text, an interpretive technique that had been flatly rejected by
Justice Black in Oklahoma Tax Commission.35
Oklahoma Tax Commission had rejected tax exemptions by implication for Indians.36 But Oklahoma Tax Commission became more
doubtful with Big Eagle v. United States.37 In Big Eagle, the Court of
Claims held that tribal mineral deposits’ royalty income was exempt
27

West v. Okla. Tax Comm’n, 334 U.S. 717, 727 (1948).
Id. at 726.
29 Id.
30 Id. at 728.
31 Id. at 718.
32 See COHEN, supra note 11, at 423 (discussing the differences between these Supreme Court decisions and concluding that the “relationship of these decisions thus bear
examination.”).
33 Squire v. Capoeman, 351 U.S. 1, 10 (1956). The timber was sold at government
discretion. Id. at 4.
34 Id. at 10.
35 Compare Squire, 351 U.S. at 10 (interpreting an exemption from taxation through
the General Allotment Act), with Okla. Tax Comm’n v. United States, 319 U.S. 598, 604
(1943) (concluding that to imply a tax exemption into the Act would be an incorrect
reading of the text).
36 Okla. Tax Comm’n, 319 U.S. at 607 (“[W]e cannot assume that Congress will
choose to aid the Indians by permanently granting them immunity from taxes . . . . ”).
37 Big Eagle v. United States, 300 F.2d 765, 771 (Ct. Cl. 1962) (per curiam).
28
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from the federal income tax.38 The I.R.S., following the rationale of
Justice Black, argued that the “Osage Allotment Act, as amended,
neither expressly nor impliedly confers tax exempt status on either the
taxpayers themselves or on their headright income.”39 Rather than a
knee-jerk application of Black’s reasoning, the Big Eagle Court weighed
Black’s favored rule of statutory construction against Murphy’s in his
Oklahoma Tax Commissioner dissent, explaining that
it is necessary to assess the weight to be given to two principles
difficult to reconcile. The first of these, as laid down by [Justice Black], is that tax exemptions must be clearly expressed
and cannot be granted by implication. The second principle is
that statutes affecting Indians must be liberally construed, with
all doubtful expressions being resolved in their favor.40
The Court of Claims then quoted from Justice Murphy’s dissent, concluded that Congressional “silence is conclusive” and found the Indian
taxpayers’ income nontaxable.41
In 1973, the Court once again considered the opposed rules of construction with tax statutes involving Native Americans – the one requiring tax exemptions to be express, the other presuming tax exemptions
by implication – in United States v. Mason.42 The trajectory of judicial
decisions after West suggested that the Court would simply jettison the
first rule. The Mason plaintiffs asserted that the United States, as trustee, had breached its duty by failing to resist paying a tax on Indian trust
property.43 They argued confidently that West was “so undermined by
later decisions of this and other courts that the United States had an
obligation to challenge its continuing validity.”44 The Court disagreed.
It characterized West as “fully consistent with later developments.”45
The power of Oklahoma Tax Commissioner’s reasoning is thus uncertain. In an estate planning context, if one is faced with a state tax on
Indian property where Congress’ intent is ambiguous, which statutory
presumption applies? Justice Black’s 1943 opinion adhered to the general rule against granting tax exemptions by implication.46 It rejected a
38

Id. at 772.
Id. at 766.
40 Id. at 769.
41 Id. at 772.
42 United States v. Mason, 412 U.S. 391, 394 (1973).
43 Id. at 391.
44 Id. at 392.
45 Id. at 400.
46 But see Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 534 U.S. 84, 95 (2001) (finding tribes
liable for federal occupational excise taxes assessed against “pull-tab” Indian gaming
activities).
39
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presumption of contextual tax exemptions for Native Americans.47
That reasoning has been followed inconsistently.48 Yet it has not been
overruled, either. Perhaps the historical emphases in the Oklahoma Tax
Commissioner dissent still have life in them.49

47

Id. at 86.
Compare Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Stranburg, 799 F.3d 1324, 1345 (11th Cir. 2015)
(holding utility taxes for Indian tribe violated federal Indian law), with Chickasaw Nation, 534 U.S. at 86 (holding no tax exemptions for Indian gaming under the Internal
Revenue Code).
49 See, e.g., Seminole Tribe of Fla., 799 F.3d at 1345 (holding a federal regulatory
scheme preempted a state’s imposition of rental tax on reservation land) cert. denied
(2016). Speaking for the majority, Chief Judge Rosenbaum wrote “Benjamin Franklin
said, ‘[I]n this world nothing can be said to be certain, except death and taxes.’ He was
almost right. As this case illustrates, even taxes are not certain when it comes to matters
affecting Indian tribes.” Id. at 1326 (citation omitted).
48

